Mock Policy Memo: Reparative Justice for Climate Refugees
I wrote this policy memo as an intellectual exercise exploring the issue of ethical responsibility for climate displacement.
Executive Summary
The present issue of climate-related displacement will almost certainly increase in magnitude. Echoing the work of scholars like political philosopher Rebecca Buxton and risk & disaster scientist Bayes Ahmed, I argue that the MECC Division of the IOM should legally define and facilitate climate migration to those countries it has deemed most responsible for climate change. This is a necessary form of reparative justice for climate refugees.
Background
Current and Future Climate Migration
As of 2009, there may be more climate refugees than political refugees.[1] Countries like the Maldives, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and others primarily in the Global South are already struggling to withstand the effects of rising sea levels.[2] A yearly average of 24 million people were displaced by weather-related disasters from 2008 to 2018,[3] and such disasters are becoming increasingly common. Although highly contested, present estimates range from 25 million to 1 billion climate migrants worldwide by 2050.[4] Most climate refugees migrate within their countries’ borders, but some will be forced to cross international borders. This demands a clear response by the IOM in the form of structured, ambitious recommendations based in empirical analysis as well as moral courage.
Losses Created by Climate Displacement
Those displaced by climate change-related disasters face risks and harm to their lives and livelihoods, to their health, and to their economic status. The intangible cultural losses that are loss of home and of a sense of place, and of the family and community structure that comes with it, are likewise significant. This is especially severe for those with thousands of years of history linked to one particular place. Relatedly, the loss of land submerged by sea level rise is a loss of collective self-determination. It “has the same effect as foreign invasion, assimilation and annexation; the state loses effective control and cannot exercise jurisdiction. Submergence therefore appears relevantly similar to historic forms of state death.”[5]
Reparative Justice for Climate Refugees
The wealthy countries that have primarily contributed to and benefited from high energy consumption are ethically obligated to take substantive reparative justice measures. There is a disconnect between responsibility and consequences: “The plight of climate refugees is caused by the emissions of other states [and the] soon-to-be-submerged states have historically been the lowest emitters.”[6] The states sending most climate refugees are unable to protect their citizens or facilitate resettlement due to disenfranchisement rooted in colonial histories.[7] Those disproportionately responsible for climate change owe reparations to those disproportionately harmed by it.
Recommendations to IOM
1. Create a clear international legal definition of climate refugees.
International law lacks a clear definition of the term “climate refugee.” Defining this term is a challenging endeavor. Climate may be one of several factors contributing to an individual’s forced migration, and it often reveals its effects gradually (e.g., via desertification). Nevertheless, establishing a system for classifying international climate refugees is crucial to institutional justice. For instance, many Pacific Islanders have applied for environmental refugee status in Australia and New Zealand and have not been accepted for lack of such a legal category.[8] One applicant, Kiribatian Ioane Teitiota, applied because his island was being perilously flooded by water. He and his family were denied due to outdated definitions of who constitutes a refugee.[9]
There are a number of useful models for this definition. The Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons clearly defines “environmentally-displaced persons.”[10] Similarly, the Nansen Initiative is a “process to build consensus on a Protection Agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change.”[11]
2. Establish which countries are most responsible for climate change, and recommend that these countries accept refugees in proportion to their degree of responsibility.
Risk & disaster scientist Bayes Ahmed has established a system to designate responsibility for accepting climate refugees based on per capita CO2 emissions, GNI, human development index, and planetary resource consumption.[12] This model is controversial in its assignment of blame for climate change. Nevertheless, IOM should assess such models for viability as a possible empirical means of assigning responsibility, or it should create its own model along similar lines.
3. Recommend that responsible countries fund climate migration and resettlement outside their own countries.
Most climate-related displacement is internal, which nevertheless has economic and social costs to refugees and their home countries. Wealthy, top-polluting countries therefore hold an obligation to fund resettlement within those countries most affected by climate change. Additionally, the countries hosting the most refugees are in the Global South. They typically lack the resources to support existing refugee populations, let alone accept more refugees.[13] In order to remove this unjust strain on vulnerable nations, the IOM should hold wealthy states responsible for providing overburdened states with financial support for refugees.
Challenges and Limitations
1. Global rise of far-right, anti-immigrant movements
The last decade has been marked by the rise of far-right nationalist movements and -immigrant sentiment throughout much of the United States and Europe. This will limit these states’ compliance with the IOM’s pro-migrant recommendations. Likewise, after immigration, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violence undermine efforts to welcome refugees into new societies and inhibit the evolution of national identity to accommodate new multi-ethnic, multicultural realities.
2. Global North governments will balk at costs of accepting refugees and funding resettlement
Wealthy states will likely object to any financial sacrifice. This attitude is widespread and intractable. However, many wealthy, post-industrial societies are currently undergoing demographic crises. Their working-age populations are shrinking. Especially with investment in vocational training programs, an influx of new workers will invigorate their economies.
By paying these costs for climate refugees, powerful countries are in effect paying for their decades of willful inaction on climate change. Knowing the international community will hold them responsible for costly reparative justice as climate change progresses may motivate states to take present action on climate change mitigation, thereby reducing future adaptation costs.
Conclusion
As climate-related displacement increases, the problem of how the international legal community ought to address this crisis will become ever more pressing. The IOM should take immediate action to establish responsibility for climate refugee resettlement, and should make recommendations for response to the crisis in light of this responsibility. The IOM has an opportunity to further reparative justice for a long history of colonial exploitation that today manifests in climate-related inequities and uneven distribution of climate burdens. My recommendations begin to allocate these burdens more fairly.
References
[1] IFRC. Climate Change and Human Mobility: A Humanitarian Point of View. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 2009.
[2] Mandal, Rudresh, and Hardik Subedi. “The Quandary of the Climate Change Migrants: Revisiting the Climate Change Displacement Co-Ordination Facility and Their Legal Status.” The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1 Aug. 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2017/08/01/the-quandary-of-the-climate-change-migrants-revisiting-the-climate-change-displacement-co-ordination-facility-and-their-legal-status/.
[3] IMDC. Global Internal Displacement Database. http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data. Accessed 15 Dec. 2019.
[4] United Nations University. “Climate Migrants Might Reach One Billion by 2050.” United Nations University, 2017, https://unu.edu/media-relations/media-coverage/climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-by-2050.html.
[5] Buxton, Rebecca. “Reparative Justice for Climate Refugees,” p. 196. Philosophy, vol. 94, no. 2, Apr. 2019, pp. 193–219.
[6] Ibid., p. 196
[7] Ahmed, Bayes. “Who Takes Responsibility for the Climate Refugees?,” p. 19. International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, vol. 10, no. 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 5–26.
[8] Koerth, Maggie. “The World Isn’t Ready For Climate Refugees.” FiveThirtyEight, 12 Sept. 2019, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-world-isnt-ready-for-climate-refugees/.
[9] Buchanan, Kelly. New Zealand: ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Case Overview. The Law Library of Congress, July 2015, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/climate-change-refugee/new-zealand.php.
[10] Prieur, Michel. Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons. UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/prieur-convention_on_the_international_status_of_environmentally.pdf.
[11] The Nansen Initiative. https://www.nanseninitiative.org/. Accessed 15 Dec. 2019.
[12] Ahmed, p. 15
[13] Atapattu, Sumudu. “‘Climate Refugees’ and the Role of International Law.” Oxford Research Group, 2018, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/climate-refugees-and-the-role-of-international-law.
